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The Cross-Section of European IPO Returns 
 
 





We apply a sector-based approach to companies going public in the six largest 
Continental European markets and Sweden during a period characterized by 
dramatic change. For a sample of 973 IPOs during 1988 and 1998, there is 
considerable underpricing which is time-varying and related to company 
characteristics. Much of the large amounts of money left on the table is due to 
privatization issues. For the sample as a whole, IPOs did not underperform in the 
long-run. Over shorter measurement horizons, we find overperformance. IPO 
performance is sensitive to market condition at the time of going public and IPO 
issuing characteristic. The favourable performance for the sample as a whole is 
driven by New Economy IPOs accounting for 28 percent of the sample. The 
pervasiveness of the outperformance of New Economy IPOs sheds light on the 
drivers behind the dramatic shift in industry composition of European IPOs in 
favor of New Economy IPOs during the Internet Bubble. 
   
 
 
THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) has grown rapidly 
over the past decade. Much of this literature has focused on documenting and 
explaining empirical patterns associated with the phenomena surrounding IPOs: 
underpricing, hot issue markets, and long-run underperformance. The patterns and 
models that try to explain them are mostly from an American perspective whereas the 
European marketplace has received considerably less attention.   
In this study, we seek to close this gap by extending the international evidence on 
IPOs to include 973 companies which went public on the six largest Continental 
European markets and Sweden between 1988 and 1998. The extension of empirical IPO 
work to a pan-European scale responds to a number of fundamental developments 
during the past decade which have shaped European stock markets.   
First, throughout the 1990s, the European IPO market has developed as one of the 
cornerstones of the worldwide IPO market. This has been fostered either by 
privatization programs introducing equity culture to the Continental European 
marketplace, by initially highly successful stock exchange segments catering to 
companies in high-growth industries, or by the convergence of listing requirements, 
reporting rules and pricing mechanisms across Europe. Within this setting, European 
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IPO activity has overtaken US IPO activity. During the late 1990s, more companies 
went public and more funds were raised by companies on the European market 
segments than in the US.1  Second, European integration has been at work for some 
time now, and the changes brought about by the introduction of the European single 
currency and the adoption of a common monetary policy have resulted in a dramatic 
change in portfolio allocation decisions. As the barriers to cross-border investing have 
declined, it has become increasingly important for issuers and investors alike to evaluate 
the European market from the perspective of a full set of available opportunities across 
countries. One of those consequences has been the rise of pan-European sector analysis 
at the expense of individual country analysis. Third, by taking a pan-European 
perspective, we are able to investigate the performance patterns of a large enough 
sample of IPOs over a period that stretches beyond the rising markets of the late 1990s. 
This allows us to shed more light on the generality of the empirical patterns and 
theoretical foundations associated with IPOs. Finally, to the degree that a broad industry 
mix characterizes our sample of European IPOs, this analysis may also provide an 
interesting perspective of the performance of US IPOs in the post-bubble period.2  
Some issues are of particular interest. Our first objective is to study the underpricing 
phenomenon for European IPOs. Here, we are interested in whether initial returns are 
time-varying and related to company characteristics. We are also interested in studying 
the relation between short-run and long-run IPO returns because institutional 
arrangements in the IPO aftermarket that are unrelated to fundamentals seem to affect 
the IPO price dynamics. These institutional arrangements include short-selling 
restrictions (Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002)), the quiet period (Bradley, Jordan and 
Ritter (2002)), aftermarket stabilization through price support (Aggarwal (2002)) and 
the expiration of the lock-up period (Bradley, Jordan, Roten, and Yi, (2001)). Recent 
studies show that IPO underperformance is a time-varying phenomenon (Gompers and 
Lerner (2001)) or disappears in sub-sample analysis (Brav and Gompers (1997)). We 
study how European IPO returns relate to this evidence. Finally, the sample period has 
also been characterized by unprecedented changes in global economies caused by the 
increasing role of technology, the effects of which are still subject to intense debate 
(Gordon (2001)). This has had a dramatic impact on the composition of equity indices 
in general, and the nature of companies seeking an IPO in particular. We are interested 
in finding out whether the performance patterns of European IPOs mirror this change.  
In this respect we make a number of interesting observations that appear robust 
across various methodological choices:  
(1) For the sample of 973 European IPOs offered between 1988 and 1998, we 
find considerable underpricing which is time-varying and related to proxies of 
uncertainty, such as age or sector. There is a large discrepancy between the 
mean and median amount of money left on the table which is due to the 
impact of large privatizations.   
(2) For the sample as a whole we do not find long-run underperformance. This is 
consistent with Gompers and Lerners (2001) conjecture that long-run IPO 
underperformance is a time-varying phenomenon. Over the short-run, there is 
significant absolute and relative overperformance.  This result supports the 
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international patterns and institutional practices.   
2 Ritter (2002) reports a median age of 14 years for US IPOs in 2002, the oldest for any year between 
1980 and 2002, much higher than the median age of seven years reported over the whole 23-year period. 
This is similar to the median age of 17 years for our sample of European IPOs between 1988 and 1998.  
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growing literature that addresses the effect of institutional practices on the 
IPO return dynamics (Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2002)).  
(3)  IPOs offered in hot markets, during which the general market is generally 
rising and which have the highest initial return, are associated with the best 
absolute and relative IPO performance. IPOs offered in cold markets, where 
underpricing is lower and stock markets are either stable or falling, 
experience poorer absolute and relative aftermarket performance. For the 
sample as a whole, this does not necessarily indicate that European IPOs 
issued in hot markets were aggressively priced in order to take advantage of 
windows of opportunity.    
(4) The study emphasizes the significant difference in IPO performance of sub-
groups of IPOs (Brav and Gompers (1997)). There is strong evidence to 
support the fact that aftermarket performance is positively related to 
underpricing and negatively related to the size of the public float. Moreover, 
the relatively favourable aftermarket performance throughout the sample 
period is driven by New Economy IPOs, which account for 28 percent of the 
sample on average. This can help to explain the dramatic shift in industry 
composition of IPOs towards New Economy IPOs during the Internet 
Bubble of 1999 and 2000.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section I discusses the empirical 
anomalies associated with IPOs and surveys some of the main theories that try to 
explain them. The data, sample and methodology are described in Section II. In Section 
III, we turn to the examination of initial and aftermarket performance. Here, we also 
study aftermarket performance when categorized according to issuing characteristics 
and present regression results. Section IV concludes the chapter and discusses the 
significance of our findings in order to help to explain recent events. 
 
 
I.  Patterns in IPOs 
 
A. Initial Pricing  
 
One observed pattern in IPOs concerns the existence of abnormal initial returns, 
whereby the first market price is on average significantly higher than the offering price. 
This adjustment is usually interpreted as evidence of IPO underpricing. Over the years, 
a large body of literature has documented the underpricing phenomenon (Logue (1973), 
Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1984), Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988)). In a recent study, 
Ritter and Welch (2002) find an average first-day return of 18.8 percent when looking at 
6,240 US IPOs issued between 1980 and 2001. The underpricing phenomenon has also 
been documented internationally (Loughran and Ritter (1995)). 
A number of papers reviewing the theoretical literature classify the theories of 
underpricing based on whether the information between issuer, underwriter and 
different groups of investors is assumed to be symmetric or not. The underwriter plays a 
particularly crucial role. It performs three main functions: underwriting, advising and 
distribution. Owing to the potentially conflicting incentives offered by these functions, 
underwriters may face a trade-off between the costs and benefits of underpricing. On the 
one hand, for instance, underpricing may lower both the risk that the issue fails as well 
as the efforts in marketing. On the other hand, since underwriting fees are typically 
proportional to gross floatation proceeds, and thus negatively related to the degree of 
underpricing, investment banks should have an incentive to minimize underpricing. 
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Because of the important role of an investment bank in practice, we divide the theories 
related to underpricing into two sections on the premise that explanations related to the 
underpricing phenomenon assume a more passive or active role of the underwriter.3  It 
must be noted that many of the underpricing theories are not mutually exclusive. 
 
A.1. Theories assuming a passive role of the underwriter 
 
Winners Curse 
One model, in which underwriters act primarily as passive agents for the issuing 
firm, has been developed by Rock (1986). His winners curse hypothesis explains the 
underpricing phenomenon in terms of information asymmetry among the different 
groups of investors, the issuing firm and the underwriter. The information asymmetry 
arises because an issuer faces an unknown demand for its shares from two types of 
investors. The first group consists of outside or informed investors who have better 
knowledge about the prospective cash flow than does the issuing firm and its 
underwriter for which it incurred a cost. These informed investors will only submit 
purchase orders if the offering price is less than the true value of the IPO.  The second 
type, uninformed investors, lack special knowledge about firm value. They may 
participate in the market even though they did not purchase information. Consequently, 
informed investors will bid for more shares of the more successful firms, which will 
leave the uninformed investors with a disproportionate amount of the less successful 
IPOs. In addition, since the allocation is not made on a pro rata basis and over 
subscription and rationing can occur, the bias against uninformed investors can be even 
larger if the underwriters favor the informed investors. This information asymmetry 
may lead to Akerlofs (1970) lemons problem, where the uninformed investor ends up 
primarily with the less successful issues. Underpricing the issue results in compensating 
uninformed investors for the bias in the allocation mechanism. The model generates a 
number of empirical predictions. For example, underpricing will be directly 
proportionate to the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the issue.  
The empirical literature is supportive of the models predictions in countries where 
underwriters play a relatively passive role in bringing new issues to market. Koh and 
Walter (1989), using information on rationing, find that an uninformed strategy in 
Singapore just about broke even.  Keloharju (1993) also finds evidence of a winners 
curse in Finland. Ritter (1984) verifies some predictions and finds a monotonous link 
between underpricing and empirical proxies for uncertainty, such as sales and the daily 




In the information cascades or herding hypothesis, developed by Welch (1992), it 
is assumed that, in aggregate, investors hold perfectly accurate information about the 
issuing firm. However, information concerning the value of the shares is highly 
uncertain for investors. Furthermore, it is assumed that it takes investment bankers time 
to approach interested investors because of their limited distribution channels. The 
hypothesis draws from the notion that potential investors base their investment 
decisions not only on their own information about the issue, but also on whether or not 
other investors, who were approached earlier, are purchasing. Thus, subsequent 
                                                
3 The recent literature on IPO underpricing focuses on the institutional aspects of underpricing and the 
role of the underwriter. In particular, the theory and evidence concerning the allocation of shares has 
stimulated a large number of papers. See Ritter and Welch (2002) for a literature survey.  
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investors will view the actions of previous investors as an indication of what 
information they hold privately. Thus, they will imitate the purchasing decisions of their 
predecessors. Consequently, an issuer may want to underprice an offering to induce the 
first few potential investors to buy and induce a cascade in which all subsequent 
investors want to buy irrespective of their own information. When combining the 
cascades hypothesis within a setting of a pricing process in which the underwriter 
dynamically adjusts the IPO price, positively sloped demand curves can result.4  
Empirical support for the cascades hypothesis is mixed. Barry and Jennings (1992) 
reject the cascades model in favor of the dynamic information acquisition argument, 
while in a recent work, Amihud, Hauser and Kirsh (2002) test the theory on a sample of 
284 IPOs in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange between 1989 and 1993 and find evidence 
consistent with herding. More specifically, they found that investors either subscribed 
overwhelmingly to new issues, which resulted in very small allocations, or largely 
abstained from subscribing so that the issue was undersubscribed and subscribers 
received full allocations, with very few cases in-between.    
 
Signaling 
Another line of theoretical literature reverses Rocks assumption regarding 
informational asymmetry and assumes that the issuer is better informed than investors. 
Here, underpricing is a means for high quality firms to distinguish themselves from low 
quality issuers. These studies are motivated by Ibbotsons (1975) conjecture that the 
issuer may want to leave a good taste in investors mouths. In the signaling models, 
banks are simply assumed to be passive distributors of shares to the general public.  
In Allen and Faulhaber (1989), bad managers, who are more likely to run bad firms, 
are deterred from mimicking good managers who underprice, because subsequent cash 
flows partially reveal the firms type. Consequently, their model implies that firms that 
underprice more are likelier to have higher dividends, and that the market reacts more 
favourably to dividend announcements by firms that underprice more. In Welchs 
(1989) model, risk-neutral entrepreneurs sell a fraction of their firm in an unseasoned 
offering and the remainder in a subsequent seasoned offering. Low-quality firms that 
mimic high quality firms must pay an exogenously specified operation cost, which the 
high-quality firms do not incur. In some cases, this cost may be insufficient to deter 
mimicking, and underpricing becomes the additional wedge that deters low-quality 
firms in the separating equilibrium. In Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), a firm employs two 
signals to convey the mean and variance of its future cash flow: the degree of 
underpricing and the fraction of shares held by insiders. To overcome the asymmetric 
information problem, the issuer signals the true value of the firm by offering shares at a 
discount and by retaining some of the shares. In the models separating equilibrium, a 
firms intrinsic value is positively related to underpricing. This model is a generalization 
of Leland and Pyles (1977) signaling hypothesis which suggests that, by retaining a 
significant ownership stake in the firm, entrepreneurs can signal project quality as false 
representation can be costly. The hypothesis therefore predicts relatively superior 
performance of IPO firms with high entrepreneurial ownership.  
                                                
4 Similar dynamics can be applied when a cut in the offer price may actually scare away potential 
investors. See Financial Times (June 26, 2002) for the dynamics leading to the postponement and 
eventual cancellation of the IPO of Prada SpA, and CBS Marketwatch.com (July 2, 2002), describing the 
circumstances surrounding the IPO of CIT Group Inc., an insurance company and Tyco International Inc. 
spin-off, which offered shares at $23 against an expected range of $25 to $29 and closed at $22 after the 
first day of trading in an adverse company and market environment.   
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The empirical support for the signaling models of underpricing is mixed. Michaely 
and Shaw (1994) find no support for signaling. They find no evidence of either a higher 
propensity to pay dividends for IPOs that were more underpriced or of a higher 
propensity to return to the market for a seasoned equity offering.  The insider holding 
variable has no significant power to explain initial returns and there is no evidence to 
suggest that insider holdings provide a credible signal of firm quality that reduces 
uncertainty and, therefore, initial underpricing. Neither the initial-day return nor the 
fraction held by insiders seems to explain the value of the firm two years after going 
public. Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch (1993) find that returns after the first day are 
just as effective in inducing future issuing activity as the first-day returns are.  While 
providing evidence suggesting a positive relation between managerial ownership 
retention and post-IPO operating performance, Jain and Kini (1994) find no support that 
firms that underprice more produce superior operating performance after the IPO.  
 
Legal Liability 
A further line of research does not rely on asymmetric information that is resolved 
on the first day of trading. Ibbotson (1975) and Tinic (1988) have suggested that the 
issuing firm may underprice to reduce the legal liability arising from any false or 
inadequate information in the prospectuses.  
Drake and Vetsuypens (1992), however, call such a conclusion into question. By 
examining a sample of 93 US firms from 1969 to 1990 that are sued after their IPO, 
they find that the average initial return for the sample firms is approximately the same 
as that for a control group of IPOs of similar size. They also present evidence that 
litigation typically results from some unfavourable company-specific news in the 
aftermarket and not from IPO overpricing on the first trading day. Keloharju (1993) 
argues that, given the paucity of legal liabilities associated with the process of going 
public in Finland, it is unlikely that potential legal liability has much to do with the 
observed initial returns.5 
 
A.2. Theories assuming an active role of the underwriter 
 
Underwriter Reputation  
While their focus was on signaling firm quality through underpricing, Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) had already noted that signaling could also be 
accomplished through the choice of underwriter. 
Carter and Manaster (1990) uncovered that high-quality underwriters are typically 
associated with less underpricing. Findings in Beatty and Welch (1996) and Cooney, 
Singh, Carter and Dark (2001) document, however, that the relationship between 
underwriter reputation and underpricing has changed over time, casting doubt on the 
theory. Loughran and Ritter (2001) report that unlike the 1980s, IPOs that are managed 
by high-prestige underwriters during the internet boom in the late 1990s are associated 
with more underpricing than IPOs managed by less prestigious underwriters.   
 
Underwriter Price support 
Ruud (1993) challenges the conventional view that positive average initial IPO 
returns result from deliberate underpricing. By investigating the distribution of initial 
                                                
5 Chalmers, Dann and Harford (2002) analyze a sample of 72 US IPOs between 1992 and 1996 and 
investigate the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. They find a significant negative relation 
between the three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in 
conjunction with the IPO.   
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returns of 469 IPOs in 1982 and 1983, she shows that positive mean initial returns result 
from a partially censored left (negative) tail. She argues that underwriter price support 
or stabilization can account for this censoring of the distribution of initial returns 
because in the US regulatory framework, the practice is not considered manipulative as 
long as it is disclosed in the offering prospectus. The theory predicts that a large 
percentage of stocks should experience positive initial and short-run abnormal 
aftermarket returns. More specifically, because underwriters remove price support over 
time, prices of fully priced or just-underpriced IPOs are more likely to fall than to rise 
over the short-term.6   
Miller and Reilly (1987) examine the returns and spread behaviour of IPOs over the 
first five days of trading and find that the relation of the spread and its determinants 
differs between overpriced and underpriced issues only on the first trading day. For a 
sample of 1,523 NASDAQ IPOs issued between 1982 and 1987, Hanley, Kumar and 
Seguin (1993) find evidence suggesting that stabilization significantly affects quoted 
spreads. Moreover, significant negative returns are documented after the termination of 
stabilization.  
 
Dynamic Information Acquisition  
The dynamic information acquisition argument - also referred to as bookbuilding 
theory or information-gathering theory (Beneviste and Spindt (1989), Beneviste and 
Wilhelm (1990) and Spatt and Srivastava (1991)) - studies the process whereby the 
offer price is set and its effect on underpricing. The assumed pricing mechanism is the 
bookbuilding process, whereby, after setting a preliminary offer price range, the 
underwriter and issuer solicit indications of interest from prospective investors during 
the road show, where the company is marketed to selected, typically institutional 
investors. Through bookbuilding, investment banks extract information about the true 
value from investors.7  The investors natural inclination to bid lower during the 
marketing phase entails a trade-off: while it increases the potential profit from selling 
the IPO in the immediate aftermarket, assuming shares have been allocated at the 
offering price, it also jeopardizes the probability and size of their allocations. In order to 
induce investors to reveal that they want to purchase shares at a high price, the 
investment banker must offer them a combination of underpricing and share allocations 
in return.  
There is strong empirical support for the bookbuilding theory of underpricing. 
Hanley (1993) documents that the relation of the final offer price to the range of 
anticipated offer prices disclosed in the preliminary prospectus, is a good predictor of 
initial returns. Having documented evidence for the partial adjustment phenomenon for 
a sample of 1,430 US IPOs from January through September 1987, she finds that issuers 
that have final offer prices exceeding the limits of the offer range have greater 
underpricing than all other IPOs, and are also more likely to increase the number of 
shares issued. The final offer price only partially adjusts to new information. Using a 
unique dataset from 39 international equity issues that used bookbuilding between 1995 
and 1997, Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) find that the investment banker awards more 
shares to bidders who provide information in their bids or to those who bid regularly. 
 
 
                                                
6 Aggarwal (2000) provides a detailed account of the mechanics of stabilization in the aftermarket.  
7 In a more general context, Jenkinson, Ljungqvist, and Wilhelm (2000) use a dataset of 2,051 IPOs in 61 
non-US markets during the period 1992-1999 and find that bookbuilding  while costing around twice as 
much as the fixed costs offering - leads to substantially less underpricing.  
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Investment Bankers Monopsony Power 
Baron (1982) offers an agency-based explanation for underpricing. His theory 
assumes that the value of a new issue is affected by market demand and by the 
investment bankers selling effort. In the model, the investment banker is better 
informed about market demand than the issuer, but his distribution effort is 
unobservable. To address this moral hazard, the optimal contract sets the issues 
offering price below its true value, defined as the equilibrium offering price when the 
investment banker expends his best effort.  
Some empirical evidence of self-underwritten IPOs refutes this theory. Muscarella 
and Vetsuypens (1989) find that when underwriters themselves go public, their shares 
are just as underpriced, even though there is no monitoring problem. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that agency problems between underwriters and 
issuing firms, largely latent in the 1980s, have become increasingly important and are 
partly responsible for the high initial returns of Internet stocks during the late 1990s. 
They postulate that higher valuations have resulted in issuers being more complacent 
about leaving money on the table. In this context, they apply Prospect Theory, 
developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), to the IPO market.  Here, individuals 
often violate Bayes Rule and rational choice theories when making decisions under 
uncertainty in experimental settings. Loughran and Ritter (2002) predict that in most 
situations issuers will sum the wealth loss from underpricing with the larger wealth gain 
on the retained shares from a price jump, producing a net increase in wealth for pre-
issue shareholders. They empirically show that most of the money left on the table 
comes from a minority of IPOs. In the cross-section, the IPOs that were underpriced 
most were those where the offer price was revised upwards from what had been 
anticipated at the time of filing the initial price range. This observation is consistent 
with the dynamic information acquisition theory of Beneviste and Spindt (1989) and the 
empirical documentation of the partial adjustment phenomenon by Hanley (1993). It is 
also in line with Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) who argue that the opportunity cost of 
underpricing is less if the relative float is small. The complacency about underpricing, 
combined with the desire of underwriters to leave money on the table so as to receive 
indirect compensation from buy-side clients that were favoured in IPO allocations, 
resulted in even greater underpricing during the boom in Internet stocks during the late 
1990s.8   
This conjecture is similar to Shillers (1990) Impresario hypothesis of 
underpricing, whereby underwriters choose a lower offering price because they know 
that the cumulative profit of underpricing (through less transparent forms of revenue 
streams such as brokerage commissions) will be higher than maximizing revenue for the 
single event (compensation in the form of the gross underwriter spread).9   
                                                
8 For a related article see, Wall Street Journal Europe (Mai 05, 2002): eToys Sues Goldman Sachs Over 
Management of Its IPO. The relatively low price set for the IPO, the suit alleges, robbed eToys of 
hundreds of millions of dollars of cash that could have helped the company to stave off bankruptcy. The 
shares nearly quadrupled in the price on their first day of trading. The suit charged Goldman induced 
some investors to agree to give the firm a portion of the profits they later made on eToys shares in 
exchange for getting IPO stock allocation   
9 On January 22, 2002, Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), an investment bank, agreed to settle a $100 
million with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US regulatory agency, based on the 
following allegations:  From at least April 1999 through June 2000, CSFB employees allocated shares 
of IPOs to over 100 customers who were willing to funnel between 33 and 65 percent of their IPO profits 
to CSFB. The profits were channeled to CSFB in the form of excessive brokerage commissions generated 
by the customers in unrelated securities trades that the customers effected solely to satisfy CSFBs 
demands for a share of the IPO profits (Source: SEC Litigation Release No. 17327). Ritter and Welch 
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B.  Cycles in IPO activity 
 
Another anomaly associated with IPOs is the hot issue phenomenon, whereby the 
observed issuing activity exhibits significant, recurrent, and to some extent predictable 
variations over time. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) were among the first to identify 
significant autocorrelation in both the monthly number of IPOs and the monthly average 
underpricing of IPOs. Ritter (1984) studies initial returns for US IPOs between 1960 
and 1982 and finds highly significant autocorrelation in monthly average initial returns 
and in monthly IPO volume. He also observes that periods of high volume tend to 
follow periods of high average initial returns. In the cross-section of the data, he 
identifies a 15-month period during which the average initial return was 48.4 percent, as 
contrasted with an average initial return of 16.3 percent for the rest of the period. This 
hot IPO market is also concentrated in a certain class of industries and a certain group 
of underwriters. In a recent study, Lowry and Schwert (2002) find an autocorrelation 
coefficient of monthly average first-day returns of 0.60 between 1960 and 1997, which 
increased during the Internet boom in the late 1990s. They confirm a significant positive 
relation between initial returns and future IPO volume and note that, increased 
numbers of companies go public after observing that IPOs are being underpriced by the 
greatest amount. They associate the cycles in initial returns with the investment 
bankers learning process. Because the registration periods of many IPOs overlap, the 
information that underwriters learn during one firms registration period will contribute 
to the first-day returns of many IPOs.    
The prospect theory explanation of the partial adjustment phenomenon addresses 
the phenomenon of hot issue markets in a similar fashion (Loughran and Ritter 
(2001)).  It predicts that all IPOs that are in the road show stage of going public when 
there is an overall market rally, will have higher expected underpricing because offer 
prices are not raised as much as they could be. Because of the length of the 
bookbuilding period, which can take from four weeks to four months, the first day 
returns of these IPOs will be correlated.  
Shillers (1990) Impresario hypothesis can also explain the positive 
autocorrelation in IPO activity and initial returns reported in the literature. Hot 
markets appear when underwriters exploit a segment sought to be ripe for a fad. Even 
though many investors may be unwilling to follow a fad, they may find it profitable to 
follow positive feedback investment strategies (Rajan and Servaes (1993)). Acting this 
way, they may actually have caused the positive autocorrelation themselves. In the more 
general setting of fads described by Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), fads occur in hot 
issue periods when investors are especially overoptimistic about the growth potential 
of the firms that go public, induced by the Impresario, the investment bank taking the 
company public. Firms time their IPOs in precisely these periods in order to take 
advantage of windows of opportunity. It follows that hot markets for IPOs should 
be concentrated in certain industry classes, dominated by specific underwriters and that 
IPO activity should come from those companies for which issuing equity is always the 
least favoured choice of financing. Moreover, companies with the largest initial returns 




                                                                                                                                          
(2002) calculate that the practice of funneling back IPO profits through excessive trading may have 
accounted for up to 250 million shares per trading day during 1999 to 2000.   
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C. Return Dynamics in Aftermarket Trading 
 
Most of the literature on aftermarket performance concentrates on how IPO shares 
perform over three- to five years. Over those time horizons, IPO shares seem, on 
average, to perform poorly when measured against various benchmarks. Ritter (1991) 
finds that every dollar invested in a portfolio of IPOs purchased at the closing market 
price on the end of the first day of trading results in a terminal wealth of $1.3447 over 
three years, while every dollar in the matching firm results in $1.6168, a ratio of only 
0.841 during the same period. He performs the study for a total sample of 1,526 US 
IPOs of common stock in 1975-84. The international evidence also supports the notion 
of poor long-run performance. Álvarez and Gonzáles (2001), Espenlaub, Gregory and 
Tonks (1998), Giudici and Paleari (1999), Leleux and Muzyka (1998) or Schuster 
(1996) all highlight low market-adjusted long-run returns for various European IPO 
markets. Jain and Kini (1994) extend this evidence to show that long-run performance is 
also accompanied by poor financial accounting performance post-IPO relative to pre-
IPO performance. However, because there has been a sustained effort to extend 
empirical evidence on IPO performance beyond the past two decades, it has become 
apparent that the results on long-run performance are sensitive to the time-period 
chosen. In a large out-of-sample test, Gompers and Lerner (2001) study the five-year 
aftermarket performance of a sample of 3,661 US IPOs from 1935 to 1972 and find that 
the long-run performance of IPOs depends considerably on the method used for 
calculating returns and performance. The authors conclude, While the results do not 
rule out the possibility of more broad-based sentiment-driven mispricing, they provide 
little support of a distinct IPO effect. 
Another facet that has attracted much academic interest addresses the relation 
between short- and long-run IPO returns. One of the first to document the dynamics in 
aftermarket trading was Stoll and Curley (1970). They found that investors in new small 
issues floated under Regulation A in 1957, 1959, and 1963, experienced lower long-run 
rates of return than if they had invested in a portfolio of large stocks represented by the 
Standard & Poors 425 Industrial Average. However, short-run price appreciation of the 
643 companies in the sample was considerably greater than the appreciation of large-cap 
stocks. Considerable short-run overperformance is also reported in Ritter (1991) and 
Schuster (1996).  
It is difficult to explain these price dynamics in the IPO aftermarket within a semi-
rational setting. Miller (1977) proposes a theory that is consistent with the empirical 
findings. Assuming the presence of short-selling constraints and heterogeneous 
investors expectations, he argues that the prices of new issues are set not by the 
appraisal of the typical investor, but by the small minority who think highly enough of 
the investment merits of the new issue to include it in their portfolio. This divergence 
of opinion about a new issue is greatest when the stock is issued, either because the 
company has not yet started operations, or because there is uncertainty about the success 
of new products or the profitability of a major business expansion.  
As a result, short-sale constraints lead to upward biases in stock prices, as 
pessimistic investors are restricted from short-selling. Over time, as the variance of 
opinion decreases and the company acquires a history of earnings, the marginal 
investors valuation will converge towards the mean valuation and IPOs will start to 
underperform. Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2002) present a dynamic model of the 
determination of prices, lending fees and short interest that is consistent with this 
theory. They show that, if lendable securities are difficult to locate, then the price of the 
security is initially elevated and expected to decline over time. This decline increases in 
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the degree of heterogeneity of beliefs of investors about the future value of the security. 
Harrison and Kreps (1978), Morris (1996) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2002) show that 
short-selling constraints can lead to prices higher than the valuations of all investors. 
Empirically, Gecy, Musto and Reed (2001) find an extra cost to shorting hotter IPOs.  
A number of other institutional arrangements in the short-run aftermarket, unrelated 
to fundamentals, have an effect on prices. For example, some recent studies examine the 
expiration of IPO lockup agreements. Lockup agreements are a feature of US and IPOs 
in international markets and prohibit insider sales before a pre-specified date, usually 
180 calendar days after the IPO. Since insiders often own a majority of the firm, the 
potential for an increase in the supply of tradable shares following lockup expiration 
could have a significant effect on the value of the stock. Bradley, Jordan, Roten, and Yi 
(2001), Brav and Gompers (2002) and Field and Hanka (2001) document significant 
negative abnormal returns of approximately two percent around lockup expiration. 
Moreover, Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2002) investigate the performance of IPOs 
around the expiration of the quiet period  typically the first 25 calendar days in 
aftermarket trading when a company is still in registration and subject to a number of 
regulatory restrictions that prohibit certain activities, such as analyst coverage.  
 Using a sample of 1,611 firms going public over the period 1996 to 2000, they find 
that firms, for which coverage is initiated, experience a significantly positive abnormal 
return of 4.1 percent in a five-day period surrounding the end of the quiet period. This 
compares to an insignificant 0.1 percent for firms that do not have coverage initiated. 
Most of these abnormal returns experienced by firms with coverage occur in the days 
before the quiet period expires.  
Furthermore, Aggarwal (2000) pays attention to the stabilization activities of 
underwriters in the aftermarket and their influence on prices by studying a sample of 
137 US IPOs going public during May and July 1997. She finds that direct intervention 
or pure stabilization, in which an identified stabilizing bid is posted, is never done, 
and that aftermarket short-covering, which has the same result as pure stabilization, but 
has no disclosure requirements, is the principal form of stabilization. Stabilization by 
short-covering can occur because the underwriter initially sells shares in excess of the 
original amount offered, which is then covered by exercising the overalottment option 
and/or by short covering in the aftermarket during 30 calendar days after the offering. 
She also finds that stabilization seems to have a permanent rather than a temporary 
effect on prices, a similar observation made by Schultz and Zaman (1994). 
Several behavioural explanations have also been advanced for the empirical 
findings. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) relate the analysis of IPO performance to 
earnings management and find that investors do not fully take into consideration that 
financial accounts of companies going public are managed before the IPO, and therefore 
base their valuation on a naïve extrapolation of the past. They use discretionary current 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management and show that companies, which boost 
their earnings most in the IPO year, also have the worst long- run performance. Ritter 
(1991), Lerner (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1995, 2001) or Baker and Wurgler (2000) 
discuss another set of behavioural explanations for poor long-run performance. They 
suggest that stock prices periodically diverge from fundamental values, and that 
managers and investment bankers take advantage of overpricing by selling stock to 
overly optimistic investors. This in line with De Bondt and Thalers (1985) conjecture 
that, at least for low-capitalization stocks, there is a negative relation between past and 
subsequent abnormal returns on individual securities using holding periods of one year 
or more which they interpret as evidence of market overreaction. 
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II.  Data, Sample and Methodology 
 
A.  Data 
 
In order to be included in the sample, the relevant companies pursuing an IPO had to 
meet the following criteria: (1) the companys main headquarter is registered in 
Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden or Switzerland with the 
obligation to publish consolidated and/or parent company accounts, (2) the company is 
listed on one of the three tiers of the main stock exchange in the respective country: the 
Official Market, the Official Parallel Market or the New Market, and meets the relevant 
listing requirements, (3) each share is given an offer price of 5.00 units of national 
currency or more, (4) gross proceeds, measured in terms of end-1998 purchasing power, 
of the equivalent of Euro () 2.0 million or more, and (5) the offering being unseasoned 
and involved common and/or preferred stock.10 While the sample includes 
Privatizations (13), spin-offs and equity-carve outs (26), we have excluded foreign 
listings, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), investment trust and certificates, 
demutualizations and companies that transferred from one market segment to another.11   
The data was hand-collected individually from each of the respective country. It is 
unique in its entirety as it spans over a relatively long period of time covering at least 
one market cycle of IPO activity in the seven largest European countries ranked in terms 
of market capitalization, excluding the UK, and is not commercially available.12 The 
data collection process involved a two-stage process:  
First, in order to insure a most complete sample, we identified the IPOs by 
collecting information from the individual stock exchanges, national publications in the 
respective country or other sources such as regulatory agencies, central banks, 
commercial providers and, if necessary, by directly contacting the issuing company. 
This step included the search for full name of the offering company, nationality, IPO 
date and place of the offering, total number of shares issued, public float adjusted for 
overalottment options exercised, issue price, sector and year of foundation. We did not 
collect data for issuing activity in the secondary market.13  For Germany, information 
provided by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the various yearly issues of the Saling 
Aktienführer were primary data sources of company data.14 Data on French issuers and 
issuing characteristics was obtained from the annual lists published by Euronext France 
and Sociétés cotées, 1996 and 1999 edition, Cofisem. Italian IPO data came from Indici 
e Dati, 1992 and 1999 edition, Mediobanca and from the Italian Stock Exchange. 
Euronext Netherlands and Effectengids, 2000 edition, Kluwer, were the primary source 
for data on Dutch IPOs. Spanish IPO company data was obtained from the Madrid 
Official Stock Exchange Bulletins and from CNMV, the Spanish regulating agency. 
Swedish data is from annual reports of the OM Stockholm Exchanges and from Six AB. 
                                                
10 The large number of IPOs issuing dual-class shares is a relatively unique feature of the Swedish IPO 
market. For Germany, for example, only seven companies issued dual-class shares during the sample 
period 1988 to 1998.  
11 For empirical evidence relating to privatizations or equity carve-outs, see DSouza and Megginson 
(1999) or Vijh (1999). 
12 Capitaldata, a division of Euromoney PLC, is a commercial provider of IPO information. For the period 
1988 to 1998, their IPO database includes around 550 companies, almost half of our database. This 
commercially available data includes only limited cross-sectional IPO characteristics.  
13 A large number of empirical studies link seasoned issuing activity with IPO performance. For European 
markets see, for example, Espenlaub and Tonks (1998) or Stehle, Erhardt and Przyborowsky (1998).  
14 We want to thank Hoppenstedt Finanzinformationen GmbH, for allowing access to their archives.  
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The Swiss Stock Exchange and Swiss Central Bank were sources of the data for the 
sample of Swiss IPOs.15 
Second, we collected daily closing stock prices from the national stock market 
operators, academic institutions and, if necessary, commercial services.  Sources of the 
German stock price data included the University of Karlsruhe Stock Price Database, the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange and daily issues of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
French, Italian and Spanish Stock Price data was made available by Euronext Paris and 
the Italian and Madrid Stock Exchange, respectively. Data on Swedish stock returns 
was obtained from Six AB.  Dutch and Swiss stock price data was collected from 
Datastream. We used Dow Jones for the time-series data for the four size-based 
benchmark indices. Macroeconomic data such as Exchange rates and GDP deflators was 
collected from Datastream. Stock prices are adjusted for dividends, stock splits or rights 
offerings and were calibrated to a European trading day calendar and converted into 
Euro (). Share prices represent closing prices and care was taken that quotations 
represented actual trades. For our sector analysis, we use the Dow Jones STOXX global 
sector classification standard.16 
The resulting IPO sample is comprised of 973 companies that conducted an IPO of 
common and/or preferred stock between 1988 and 1998 on one of the three main market 
segments of the main national stock exchange operators in Germany (219 companies), 
France (323), Italy (77), The Netherlands (75), Spain (88), Sweden (148) and 
Switzerland (43).17 Based on our original stock exchange records, this represents at least 
90 percent of IPO activity in Continental Europe between 1988 and 1998, measured in 
terms of number of IPOs and aggregate gross proceeds. The sample does not suffer 
from survivorship bias. Only seven companies were delisted before their third-year 
anniversary. In this section, we look at IPOs issued over the period 1988 to 1998 using 
stock returns through February 23, 2001. This implies a declining sample size of 686 
companies when measuring returns over three years and 381 companies when 




In Table I, we provide some summary statistics for our sample.19 While presenting 
evidence for the sample as a whole, we also divide IPOs based on whether they were
                                                
15 Prof. Alfred Mettler kindly supplied fundamental data on Swiss IPOs issued between 1988 and 1990.  
16 The Dow Jones STOXX global industry classification standard is displayed in the Appendix, Table AI.  
17 The market segments are (Number of IPOs in brackets): Germany (Deutsche Börse AG: Amtlicher 
Handel (80), Geregelter Markt (89), Neuer Markt (50)); France (SBF-Paris Bourse SA*: Premier Marché 
(21), Second Marché (231), Nouveau Marché (71)); Italy (Borsa Italiana SpA: Borsa Valori (70) Mercato 
Ristretto (7)); The Netherlands (Amsterdam Exchanges NV*: Officiële Markt, (56) Officiële Parallel 
Markt (8)); Spain (Bolsa de Madrid SA: Primer Mercado (56), Segundo Mercado (32)); Sweden (OM 
Stockholm Exchanges AB: A-list (15), OTC-list (52), O-list (81)); and Switzerland (SWX Swiss 
Exchange AG: SWX Hauptsegment, (35) SWX Nebensegment (8)). *Merged to Euronext SA.  
18While not reported separately here, we also calculate results with constant sample sizes of 686 and 381 
IPOs, respectively. The results confirm that changes in measurement periods and sample sizes do not 
change the qualitative nature of the findings presented here.  
19 The sample differs from US studies in some important respects. Our sample period does not overlap 
with Ritter (1991) who looks at IPOs from 1971 to 1988. Neither does it completely overlap with Brav 
and Gompers (1997) who study 3,407 nonventure-backed and 934 venture-backed US IPOs between 
1975 and 1992. Moreover, while Ritter (1991) and Brav and Gompers (1997) focus on reporting long-run 
returns over three and five years, we present evidence on the dynamics of short- and long-run 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

































issued in hot or cold markets.  Because of big fluctuations in the level of the stock 
market and IPO activity throughout the sample period, this potentially enables us to 
draw more inferences about the robustness of the patterns associated with IPOs.  
The most frequently used definition of hot IPO markets is based on volume. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), for example, describe the 1980s as hot because most of 
that decade had much higher issuance volume than the 1970s. Helwege and Liang 
(2001) define hot and cold months according to volume of issuance, based on a 
three-month centred moving average of the number of IPOs for each month in the 
sample. Similar to Ritter (1984) and Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), we define hot IPO 
markets based on the level of underpricing.21 We also include a proxy for the general 
level of the stock market into the analysis. Initially, we define those months with higher 
average monthly underpricing compared to median underpricing for the total sample as 
hot IPO months; we consider those months during which the mean is lower than the 
median as cold IPO months. We apply the same procedure to our proxy for market 
returns. Months during which the market return exceeds the median for the monthly 
series of 132 months (January 1988  December 1998), are defined as hot market 
months. Likewise, months during which the market return is less than the median are 
considered cold months. Finally, we match hot (cold) IPO months with hot 
(cold) market months to identify hot and cold IPO markets. During 118 months, 
(89 percent of the entire period), a hot (cold) IPO month corresponds to a hot 
(cold) market month. During 14 months, a hot (cold) IPO month does not 
correspond to a hot (cold) market months. We attribute part of this to seasonalities 
in the underwriting industry. The overall pattern confirms our earlier conjecture about 
the close link between the level of the stock market and underpricing.  
Of the 132 months, we identify 73 months as cold markets and 59 months as hot 
markets and mark three individual hot and cold market periods.  In more than half 
of the 132 issuing months, the general market was either stable or falling. For example, 
the longest cold market period occurred between April 1990 and September 1993. 
During this period, only 127 IPOs went public, averaging 6.13 percent initial return. 
This period was characterized by subdued economic conditions in Continental Europe 
following the German Unification. During the 42-month period, the Dow Jones STOXX 
broad-market index recorded a rise of 8.52 percent. Conversely, during the 33-month 
hot market period between April 1996 and December 1998, 496 IPOs went public 
with an average initial return of 21.64 percent. During this period, the general level of 
the market rose by 92.46 percent. Interestingly, the Asian and Russian Financial Crises 
in the autumn of 1998 did not have an impact on European IPO activity. 
Between 1988 and 1998, 973 European companies raised a total of 123.6 billion on 
the stock market. Ritter (2001) reports that during the same period, 3,872 IPOs raised a 
total of $237.9 billion in the US. The average issuing volume of European IPOs of  
127.1 million, however, is higher than the one reported for the US ($61.4 million).  
Some large offerings such as privatizations (13) and equity carveouts (26) account for 
part of the difference. For example, privatizations raised a total of 44.4 billion with a 
median issuing volume of 2.6 billion. On average, European companies going public 
have sold 33 percent of their company to the public (henceforth public float), which 
remained stable throughout the sample period. This observation is within the close 
range of 30 percent and 36 percent reported by Ritter (2001) for US IPOs issued 
between 1992 and 1998. Moreover, the average European IPO was 28 years old at the 
                                                
21 Because of the presence of some very large IPOs, defining hot and cold markets by volume does 
potentially lead to misleading results.  
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time of going public. While the average age of European IPOs has declined throughout 
the sample period, it is still high compared to companies going public in the US. Ritter 
(1991), for example, finds an average age of six years. As shown in the Appendix, 
Table AI, European IPOs are clearly widespread among the various industries. This is 
different to Helwege and Liang (2001) who study 2,072 US IPOs between 1982 and 
1993 and point out that US IPOs during this period are drawn largely from the same set 
of high-technology industries.  
Table I shows that the sample composition is clustered in certain industries: in 
cold markets, the percentage of New Economy companies of total IPO activity is 
almost half of what is observed for IPOs issued under hot markets. Moreover, the 
average size of European IPOs in cold markets is 90.3 million compared to 66.2 
million in hot markets. This reinforces the fact that IPO activity in cold markets, 
during which the stock market is generally more stable or declining, is associated with 
larger and more mature IPOs in Old Economy industries. Table I also demonstrates the 
changing composition of IPO issuers. It indicates that during the 1990s, New Economy 
sectors have gradually taken a bigger share of the total IPO market. During this time 
IPO age, size and median issuing volume has also declined considerably. This 
highlights the fact that money, previously flowing into mature industries with lower 
growth prospects, had started to flow into young, technology-oriented companies 




While the estimation of initial returns is less problematic, there are several factors 
that must be taken into account when estimating abnormal returns over longer time 
horizons. Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) both highlight the 
problems associated with calculating long-run abnormal returns using either a reference 
portfolio or an asset pricing model.  
Barber and Lyon (1997) demonstrate that many of the commonly used matching 
procedures are poorly specified and abnormal return estimates can be systematically 
nonzero. They also show that seemingly minor changes in experimental features can 
have a major impact on the results. These include the benchmark for measuring 
abnormal returns, cumulating procedures or the populations from which securities are 
drawn.22 In this context, they isolate one parametric procedure that may be well-
specified, specifically to calculate abnormal returns as the buy-and-hold returns on a 
sample firm less the buy-and-hold return on a control firm with similar size and book-
to-market characteristics.23 The authors also suggest a rebalancing bias that arises 
because the compounded returns of a reference portfolio, such as an equally weighted 
market index, are usually calculated assuming periodic rebalancing, whereas the returns 
of sample firms are compounded without rebalancing. Furthermore, they also point out 
that a new listing bias arises when an IPO firm, which is known to perform badly 
following an IPO, is added to an index which will cause the index to underperform.  
                                                
22 In context of European Markets, Dimson and Marsh (1986), report the importance of controlling for the 
size effect in the United Kingdom. Moreover, Brav and Gompers (1997) find that most institutional 
investors will not be significantly hurt by investing in IPOs because they usually do not buy the small 
issues that underperform most.   
23For the European market, this is difficult because of the relative infancy of many of the stock markets in 
the study, with few comparable quoted firms and benchmarks available over a long period of time. The 
use of the Eurostoxx value-weighted size indices as benchmarks may also induce biases that result from 
the fact that these market indices are value-weighted. 
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Kothari and Warner (1997) also show that long-horizon tests are misspecified.  They 
find that parametric long-horizon tests will often indicate abnormal performance when 
none is present and suggest that bootstrap procedures might be a promising way to 
minimize test statistic misspecification.  Moreover, they suggest a survivorship bias, 
which occurs when the de-listed firms are simply removed and the index is rebalanced. 
This bias tends to cause the index to outperform a portfolio that includes delisted firms.  
It must be noted that the inferences drawn by these authors can themselves be 
sensitive to experimental design. Both Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner 
(1997), for example, focus on measuring portfolio long-horizon performance in event 
time, rather than calendar time. As Fama (1998) points out, event time results may be 
misleading about the pervasiveness of performance because any verification of an 
observed puzzle may only reflect investor sentiment. Moreover, as noted in Shleifer and 
Summers (1990), many trading strategies are based on pseudo-signals, noise, and 
popular models are correlated, leading to aggregate demand shifts. Consequently, to the 
degree that the design of the empirical experiment has an impact on the confidence of 
the reliability of inferences from long-horizon studies, the interpretation of the results 
on the performance of European IPOs requires caution. 
For the evaluation of aftermarket IPO returns, our approach is similar to the 
empirical methodology in Ritter (1991). Consequently, we show results using BHARs, 
when reporting long-term abnormal performance of IPOs. This procedure assumes no 
monthly portfolio rebalancing.24   
However, we extend the performance analysis across several dimensions for the 
European market. Because we are interested in the dynamics of aftermarket 
performance, we report aftermarket returns over various holding periods. Furthermore, 
we also determine how the aftermarket performance of European IPOs issued in hot 
and cold markets differs. Finally, we are also interested in whether issuing 
characteristics are related to these performance dynamics and time-varying market 
conditions. We calculate equally-weighted raw- and benchmark-adjusted returns over 1, 
3, 12, 36 and 60 months, whereas one month is defined as a consecutive 21-day-trading 
interval after the close of the first day of trading. In order to eliminate the effect of 
national holidays, stock prices for the national countries were first calibrated to a 
European trading day calendar. Returns were then calculated whenever at least one of 
the seven markets covered in this study was trading. If the IPO was delisted before the 
end of the measurement period, we computed the return until the delisting date. 
Aftermarket returns are compared with four alternative size-based benchmarks, all of 
which are value-weighted: (1) The Dow Jones STOXX broad-market index, excluding 
UK, which captures the free-float adjusted market capitalization of around 95 percent of 
the market capitalization of the countries in our sample, includes 404 European 
companies and is similar in terms of industry composition to the IPO sample, (2) the 
Dow  Jones  STOXX  large-cap index,  excluding  UK  companies,  (3)  the  Dow  Jones 
STOXX  mid-cap  index,  excluding  UK  companies,  and  (4)  the  Dow Jones STOXX 
 
                                                
24 We have also calculated performance using Cumulative Average Returns (CARs). While not shown 
separately in this section, we report the results in the Appendix, Table AIII and Figure AI, respectively. 
The results on monthly portfolio rebalancing confirm that the use of BHRs biases the long-run 
performance upwards, a finding consistent with the literature (see, for example, Ritter (1991) or Teoh, 
Welch and Wong (1998)).     
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Table II 
Initial Returns of European IPOs  
Descriptive statistics for the initial return performance of European IPOs (1988-1998) under alternative 
market conditions and categorized according to age, sector, size, public float (%), and average daily 
standard deviation (S.D.) for the first 21 days of trading (unadjusted). The initial return is the difference 
from the final offering price to the first-day closing price. For example, for the youngest age group in 
hot markets, the initial return is 0.2496*100 = 24.96 percent. Based on 132 monthly observations, the 
first-order autocorrelation coefficient is i) for number of offerings: 0.597a (0.086), ii) for average monthly 
initial returns: 0.300a (0.086). In the cross-section of observations, we find a first-order autocorrelation 
coefficient for initial returns of 0.180 for Old Economy Stocks versus 0.481 for New Economy stocks. 
The first-order autocorrelation is higher for the number of offerings: 0.238 for Old Economy Stocks and 
0.639 for New Economy stocks. All coefficients are highly significant at conventional levels. Because of 
the influence of few large privatization offerings, we do not find significant autocorrelation in issuing 
volume; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parenthesis.  
 Year Market Condition  Number of Issues 
Category 1988-1998 Hot Cold Hot-Cold All Hot Cold 
Age < 14 0.2068a 0.2496a 0.0766a 0.1731a 420 316 104 
 (0.0186) (0.0239) (0.0126)   
15 ≤  Age < 36 0.1654a 0.1990a 0.0893a 0.1096a 297 206 91
 (0.0156) (0.0204) (0.0194)   
Age ≥  37 0.0969a 0.1333a 0.0562a 0.0770a 256 135 121
 (0.0130) (0.0165) (0.0199)   
New Economy 0.2718a 0.3126a 0.1048a 0.2078a 270 217 53 
 (0.0259) (0.0313) (0.0198)   
Old Economy 0.1243a 0.1592a 0.0659a 0.0932a 703 440 263
 (0.0092) (0.0127) (0.0117)   
Small firms 0.1847a 0.2129a 0.1089a 0.1040a 361 263 98 
 (0.0176) (0.0221) (0.0249)   
Medium firms 0.1729a 0.2259a 0.0619a 0.1639a 421 285 136
 (0.0161) (0.0223) (0.0124)   
Large firms 0.1114a 0.1604a 0.0463a 0.1141a 191 109 82
 (0.0153) (0.0231) (0.0158)   
Public Float  < 20  0.1413a 0.1743a 0.0794a 0.0950a 273 178 95 
 (0.0121) (0.0166) (0.0134)   
20 ≤  Public Float  < 30 0.2143a 0.2619a 0.0880a 0.1740a 241 175 66
 (0.0229) (0.0277) (0.0359)   
30 ≤  Public Float  < 50 0.1795a 0.2399a 0.0580a 0.1819a 283 189 94
 (0.0225) (0.0322) (0.0132)   
Public Float   ≥  50 0.1122a 0.1360a 0.0672a 0.0688a 176 115 61
 (0.0199) (0.0278) (0.0225)   
0.0000 ≤  S.D. < 0.0124 0.0542a 0.0810a 0.0352a 0.0458a 245 102 143 
   (0.0054) (0.0104) (0.0051)   
0.0125 ≤  S.D. < 0.0196 0.0969a 0.1288a 0.0485a 0.0803a 244 147 97
   (0.0108) (0.0158) (0.0109)   
0.0197 ≤  S.D. < 0.0314 0.1333a 0.1403a 0.1032a 0.0370 243 197 46
   (0.0119) (0.0134) (0.0258)   
0.0315 ≤  S.D. < ∞  0.3794a 0.3935a 0.2804a 0.1131 241 211 30
   (0.0329) (0.0357) (0.0828)   
All IPOs (Mean) 0.1652a 0.2098a 0.0725a 0.1374a 973 657 316 
 (0.0100) (0.0137) (0.0103)     
All IPOs (Median) 0.0714 0.0952 0.0265 0.0687 973 657 316 
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.   
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small-cap index, excluding UK companies. These indices have a history dating back to 
the start of the sample period in January 1988.25  
For this section, we also report wealth relatives (WR) by taking the ratio of one plus 
the IPO return divided by one plus the chosen benchmark return. A wealth relative less 
than one indicates that the IPO underperforms the chosen benchmark. Similarly, a 




III. Performance Analysis of European Initial Public Offerings 
 
A. Initial Returns  
 
In Table II, we present evidence concerning the underpricing phenomenon. The 
average initial return for the 973 European firms that went public between 1988 and 
1998 is 16.52 percent. The median is positive 7.14 percent where only 86 of the 973 
offerings (8.84 percent) had negative unadjusted initial returns. 129 IPOs (13.26 
percent) did not change from the offering price, supporting the conjecture that positive 
mean initial returns result from a partially censored left tail, which itself stems from 
stabilization activities by underwriters (Ruud (1993) or Aggarwal (2000)). The findings 
are generally consistent with US evidence. For a sample of 6,249 US IPOs between 
1980 and 2001, Ritter and Welch (2002) find average underpricing to be 18.8 percent, 
ranging from 5.4 percent to 22.3 percent during our sample period.   
In Figure 1, we graph IPO activity and stock market returns for the sample of 
European IPOs. The first-order autocorrelation coefficient for the time series of 132 
monthly observations of average initial returns between January 1988 and December 
1998 is 0.300. The autocorrelation is higher when looking at the monthly number of 
offerings, with a first-order autocorrelation coefficient of 0.597 during the period 
between 1988 and 1998.  Both coefficients are highly significant at conventional levels. 
Figure 1 also underlines that initial returns and issuing activity in Europe are sensitive 
to the general state of the stock market. 
Table II shows the substantial variability in average underpricing when categorizing 
the sample according to the issuing characteristics. The model uses age, market sector 
and the standard deviation of aftermarket stock prices as measures of uncertainty, 
producing results that confirm the monotonic relationship between risk and initial 
returns, as postulated in the winners curse explanation of underpricing. For the period 
1988-1998, high-risk companies (younger firms) average substantially higher initial 
returns than low-risk companies (older firms). Initial returns are 10.99 percent higher 
for the youngest age group as compared to the oldest age group in the sample.  
Differences increase to 14.75 percent when comparing underpricing of New versus Old 
Economy IPOs. Using the daily standard deviation of unadjusted aftermarket returns for 
the first month of trading, an ex-post measure of uncertainty, we confirm our 
observations. Moreover, not only do the higher-risk categories display higher initial 
returns, they also show greater variability in initial returns as indicated by the Standard 
Errors. The relationship between other issuing characteristics and initial returns,  
  
                                                
25 The chosen benchmarks also form the basis of derivative products and exchange-traded funds (ETFs). 
26 We do not adjust for betas. A broad literature argues that differences in betas are too small to have 
significant effects on the conclusions (Ibbotson (1975), Clarkson and Thomson (1990) or Chan and 
Lakonishok (1992) for the US market, and Keloharju (1993) or Leleux (1996) for European Markets).   
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Figure 1. Stock Market Returns and IPO activity. IPO proceeds are measured in 1998 
purchasing power defined as the number of shares offered to the public times the final offering price. 
Initial Return is defined as the change from the IPO price to the closing price at the end of the first day of 
trading. The annual stock market return is defined as the annual change in the value-weighted Dow Jones 
STOXX broad-market index, excluding the UK. 
 
 
however, is less clear. Size and public float do not appear to be strongly related to the 
level of underpricing. Evidence from Table II also shows that the quantitative 
relationship between company characteristics and average initial returns are not the 
same for IPO issued in hot or cold markets. We find average underpricing of 20.98 
percent in hot markets versus 7.25 percent in cold markets, a difference of 13.74 
percent. Much of this difference is attributable to underpricing among New Economy 
IPOs. This observation is similar to Ritter (1984) who relates the hot issue market of 
1980-1981 to IPOs in the natural resources sector. For each issuing characteristic, we 
also find that average initial returns are significantly higher in hot as opposed to 
cold markets. This difference is most pronounced in the category of New Economy 
IPOs, where the difference amounts to 20.78 percent. The findings confirm the effect of 
clustering by industry in hot markets.   
 It is important to put the magnitude of initial returns into perspective. Loughran and 
Ritter (2002) report that from 1990 to1998, companies going public in the US left a 
total of $27.6 billion on the table, calculated by multiplying the first-day price gain by 
the number of shares sold. Investment bankers collected fees of 13 billion during this 
period. They found that most of the money left on the table came from a minority of 
IPOs whose offering price had been revised upwards in the filing range, a finding 
consistent with the partial adjustment phenomenon (Hanley (1993)). Although the 
average amount left on the table is $9.1 million, the median is only $2.3 million. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) attribute the willingness to leave such large amounts on the 
table to Prospect Theory, whereby, in most situations, issuers will sum-up the wealth 
loss from underpricing with the larger wealth gain obtained from the retained shares.  
They also argue that leaving money on the table is an indirect form of underwriter 
compensation. For the sample of European IPOs, we find similar tendencies. The total 
amount of money left on the table during the period 1990-1998 amounted to 10.9 
billion with underwriters collecting fees upwards of 6 billion. We also find that most 
IPOs left relatively little money on the table. The average amount left on the table 
amounted to 13.4 million while the median was only 1.1 million. However, 
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Table III 
Aftermarket Performance of European IPOs 
The sample contains 973 European IPOs between 1988 and 1998. Aftermarket returns are measured as 
equally-weighted buy-and-hold returns, whereas one month is defined as a consecutive 21-day trading 
interval from the first closing price, using European trading days, assuming a declining sample size. The 
value-weighted Dow Jones STOXX size indices (Broad-Market, Large-Caps, Mid-Caps and Small-Caps), 
excluding UK, were used as a proxy for the market benchmark. The wealth relative is the ratio of one plus 
the average aftermarket period buy-and-hold IPO return, divided by one plus the average aftermarket 
period benchmark buy-and-hold return. For example, for the month 36 adjustment of IPO returns for the 
movement in the broad- market benchmark, (1 + 0.6791)/(1+0.5947) = 1.05; Standard Errors (S.E.) in 
parentheses.   
Panel A: Mean Aftermarket Performance of IPOs: All Market Conditions 
  IPO and Benchmark Returns 
 IPO Broad- Wealth Large- Wealth Mid- Wealth Small- Wealth 
Aftermarket Return Market Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative 
Month 1 0.0312a 0.0178a 1.01b 0.0206a 1.01 0.0104a 1.02a 0.0016 1.03a
(N=973) (0.0068) (0.0016) (0.0066) (0.0017) (0.0066) (0.0015) (0.0066) (0.0016) (0.0066)
Month 3 0.0591a 0.0276a 1.03a 0.0339a 1.02b 0.0102a 1.05a -0.0101a 1.07a
(N=972) (0.0111) (0.0035) (0.0104) (0.0035) (0.0105) (0.0036) (0.0105) (0.0039) (0.0105)
Month 12 0.2779a 0.1550a 1.11b 0.1791a 1.08c 0.0910a 1.17a 0.0173a 1.26a
(N=970) (0.0582) (0.0057) (0.0575) (0.0057) (0.0575) (0.0058) (0.0575) (0.0061) (0.0578)
Month 36 0.6791a 0.5947a 1.05 0.7037a 0.99 0.3462a 1.25c 0.0951a 1.53a
(N=686) (0.1746) (0.0172) (0.1729) (0.0184) (0.1729) (0.0120) (0.1733) (0.0091) (0.1735)
Month 60 0.5974a 0.6179a 0.99 1.1974a 0.73a 0.5313a 1.04 0.0933a 1.46a
(N=381) (0.1245) (0.0351) (0.1204) (0.0426) (0.1177) (0.0228) (0.1193) (0.0151) (0.1209)
Panel B: Mean Aftermarket Performance of IPOs:  Hot Markets 
  IPO and Benchmark Returns 
 IPO Broad- Wealth Large- Wealth Mid- Wealth Small- Wealth 
Aftermarket Return Market Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative 
Month 1 0.0442a 0.0232a 1.02b 0.0264a 1.02c 0.0131a 1.03a 0.0039c 1.04a
(N=657) (0.0094) (0.0021) (0.0093) (0.0022) (0.0093) (0.0020) (0.0092) (0.0020) (0.0092)
Month 3 0.0829a 0.0371a 1.04a 0.0436a 1.04a 0.0145a 1.07a -0.0066 1.09a
(N=656) (0.0156) (0.0047) (0.0147) (0.0047) (0.0147) (0.0048) (0.0147) (0.0052) (0.0148)
Month 12 0.3439a 0.1825a 1.14c 0.2068a 1.11 0.1022a 1.22a 0.0292a 1.31a
(N=655) (0.0845) (0.0075) (0.0837) (0.0076) (0.0837) (0.0075) (0.0836) (0.0078) (0.0839)
Month 36 0.8568a 0.6120a 1.15 0.7244a 1.08 0.3146a 1.41c 0.0775a 1.72a
(N=389) (0.3014) (0.0239) (0.2997) (0.0255) (0.2997) (0.0151) (0.3001) (0.0124) (0.3002)
Month 60 0.2795b 0.1264a 1.14 0.6066a 0.80a 0.2257a 1.04 -0.0903a 1.41a
(N=119) (0.1231) (0.0310) (0.1228) (0.0343) (0.1229) (0.0194) (0.1212) (0.0100) (0.1222)
Panel C: Mean Aftermarket Performance of IPOs: Cold Markets 
  IPO and Benchmark Returns 
 IPO Broad- Wealth Large- Wealth Mid- Wealth Small- Wealth 
Aftermarket Return Market Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative 
Month 1 0.0041 0.0066a 1.00 0.0087a 1.00 0.0048b 1.00 -0.0033 1.01
(N=316) (0.0069) (0.0022) (0.0068) (0.0022) (0.0068) (0.0023) (0.0068) (0.0024) (0.0069)
Month 3 0.0097 0.0077c 1.00 0.0137a 1.00 0.0014 1.01 -0.0175a 1.03a
(N=316) (0.0103) (0.0043) (0.0098) (0.0042) (0.0098) (0.0045) (0.0098) (0.0051) (0.0100)
Month 12 0.1406a 0.0978a 1.04 0.1215a 1.02 0.0679a 1.07b -0.0076 1.15a
(N=315) (0.0352) (0.0074) (0.0333) (0.0067) (0.0334) (0.0085) (0.0333) (0.0097) (0.0338)
Month 36 0.4465a 0.5719a 0.92c 0.6766a 0.86a 0.3875a 1.04 0.1182a 1.29a
(N=297) (0.0810) (0.0243) (0.0734) (0.0262) (0.0733) (0.0191) (0.0742) (0.0133) (0.0764)
Month 60 0.7418a 0.8412a 0.95 1.4657a 0.71a 0.6701a 1.04 0.1766a 1.48a
(N=262) (0.1716) (0.0425) (0.1658) (0.0522) (0.1614) (0.0281) (0.1646) (0.0194) (0.1669)




tions, which accounted for 5.2 billion of money left on the table, the average amount 
of money left on the table fell to 7.2 million.27 As Perotti and Guney (1993), Perotti 
(1995), Shafik (1996), and Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999) all point out, 
governments and their investment bankers have become extremely adept at 
manipulating the offer price and allocations terms of IPOs in order to achieve multiple, 
often competing, political and economic objectives. During the 1990s, European 
governments kick-started a European equity culture by allocating discounted shares 
from formerly state-owned monopolies to retail investors.  
 
B. Aftermarket Returns  
    
In Table III, we report the buy-and-hold performance for European IPOs issued 
between 1988 and 1998 over different holding periods starting from the close of the first 
day of trading. In Panel A, we report the benchmark-adjusted equally-weighted 
aftermarket performance for different holding periods, independent of the market 
condition at the IPO date. The results indicate that the sample of European IPOs 
outperformed all the benchmarks up to the first year of aftermarket trading. Over 12 
months, for example, the IPOs earned 27.79 percent, on average, while the broad market 
index earned 15.50 percent, a wealth relative of 1.11. However, the broad-market and 
large-cap market-adjusted wealth relatives fall substantially when measuring the 
aftermarket performance over longer periods. Over three years, for example, IPOs 
returned 67.91 percent on average while the broad market returned 59.47 percent, a ratio 
of 1.05.  Panel A also shows that IPO performance is sensitive to the benchmark 
employed. Across all measurement horizons, IPOs perform better relative to small-caps 
than relative to large-caps. In Panels B and C of Table III, we present results calculated 
according to the market condition at the time of the IPO.  We find that the favourable 
aftermarket IPO performance is mainly driven by outperformance of IPOs issued in 
hot markets. IPOs issued in cold markets underperform in the long-run. For 
example, investing in the average sample of IPOs in cold markets would have left the 
investor with only 0.92 relative to each Euro invested in the broad-market index after 
three years, while rendering 1.15 if invested during a hot market period.     
While not reported separately, the long-run performance picture changes 
dramatically when looking at the median IPO. A strategy of investing in the median IPO 
at the end of the first day of trading and holding over a three-year period, would have 
left the investor with only  0.67 relative to each Euro invested in the broad-market 
index. This underlines the skewness of the return distribution with only 28 percent of 
the issuers reporting positive broad-market-adjusted returns, and some extreme winners 
dominating the mean return picture. In the Appendix, Table AII, we have also 
calculated value-weighted results for the aftermarket performance of European IPOs. 
Brav and Gompers (1997) find that value-weighting significantly reduces performance 
differences. For the sample of European IPOs, however, value-weighting does not 
significantly change the results from equally-weighting. Indeed, the three-year broad-
market-adjusted wealth relative is 1.06 compared to 1.05 for the equally-weighted 
sample of European IPOs. The wealth relatives fall to 0.73 (equally-weighted) and 0.74 
(value-weighted) when measured over five years, respectively.  
                                                
27 While raising 27.5 billion, four privatizations (Deutsche Telecom AG, France Telecom SA, TNT 
Poest Group NV and Swisscom AG) accounted for 4.0 billion of money left on the table. From 1996 
onwards, each of these companies were brought to the market by using the bookbuilding procedure and 
recorded significant average underpricing (14.02 percent).    
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C. Cross-Sectional Results 
 
C.1. Performance Categorized by Initial Returns 
 
In order to shed more light on the dynamics of European IPO performance, this 
section distinguishes firms by issuing characteristic and provides time-series evidence 
of performance. For each issuing characteristic, we divide the sample into sub-samples 
and use dummy variables to distinguish each subsample. The resulting regression 
coefficients measure the difference in average market-adjusted returns across 
subsamples, calculated for each measurement horizon and market condition. In the rest 
of this chapter, we will focus on reporting the results adjusted for movements in the 
value-weighted Dow Jones STOXX broad-market index, excluding the UK.  
In Table IV, firms are segmented by the initial return of the IPO. The results are 
categorized according to four initial return categories and across three dimensions: IPOs 
issued in all market conditions, hot markets, and cold markets. Panel A reveals that 
there is a tendency for companies that have the highest initial returns to have the best 
aftermarket performance across all measurement horizons. Companies that have the 
lowest initial returns also exhibit the worst aftermarket performance. The result extends 
to all measurement horizons and is most significant in the short-run. Over 36 months, 
for example, the difference between the market-adjusted aftermarket performance 
between highest and lowest initial returns category is 65.52 percent.  
In Panels B and C, we are able to disentangle this observation by looking at IPOs 
issued in hot and cold markets separately.  For IPOs issued in cold markets, we 
find that the positive relationship between initial returns and broad-market-adjusted 
aftermarket performance is   more   consistent   and    more   significant, albeit   less   in   
magnitude, compared to that for hot markets. The underperformance of IPOs is most 
pervasive in the category of IPOs with zero or negative initial returns. In this category, 
IPOs issued in hot markets underperformed the market by 51.21 percent, while IPOs 
in cold markets underperformed by 14.68 percent over three years.  
The findings reveal a number of interesting patterns related to the literature. When 
considering the short-run dynamics, the result indicates a clearly significant relation 
between underpricing and performance under the three market conditions studied. 
Underpricing indeed seems to induce sentiment-driven short-run positive feedback 
strategies (Rajan and Servaes (1993)). The significantly negative returns of IPOs with 
least underpricing are also indicative of the effect of the cessation of stabilization 
activities of underwriters in the immediate aftermarket (Hanley, Kumar and Seguin 
(1992), Ruud (1993)). Moreover, the results for long-run performance contrast with 
Ritters (1991) findings which reveal a tendency for firms with high initial returns to 
have the worst aftermarket performance. This, according to the author, mildly supports 
DeBondt and Thalers (1985) overreaction hypothesis as an explanation for the poor 
long-run performance of US IPOs. The results are also not consistent with Shillers 
(1990) Impresario hypothesis, which predicts a negative relation between initial 
returns and aftermarket performance, in particular for IPOs issued in hot markets. As 
well, our findings do not correspond to the desire of issuers to avoid future lawsuits by 
underpricing (Tinic (1988)). The results, however, do support the various signaling 
theories of underpricing (Allen and Faulhaber (1989) or Grinblatt and Hwang (1989)). 
Here, underpricing separates low-quality firms from high-quality firms, since only high 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.2. Performance Categorized by Age 
 
In Table V, we segment firms according to their age at the time of going public. 
Ritter (1991) finds poor long-run performance with younger US IPOs and interprets this 
as being consistent with investor overoptimism and fads. 
For the sample of European IPOs, we find that young IPOs fare substantially better 
than old IPOs. The pattern consistently extends across all measurement horizons. The 
magnitude of the market-adjusted return difference is economically significant and 
accounts for 86.84 percent of return performance, when comparing the youngest with 
the oldest age group over 36 months. In the short-run, the patterns confirm the large 
performance differences in favor of the youngest IPO firms. For example, the 419 firms 
in the youngest age category outperform the market by 31.20 percent over one year. In 
this case, the difference with their oldest counterparts accounts for 37.90 percent. 
Results in Panels B and C of Table V indicate that the relationship between age and 
aftermarket returns is not the same for IPOs issued during hot and cold markets. In 
hot markets, the youngest IPOs have overperformed old firms by 150.79 percent over 
three years, with similarly positive dynamics over shorter measurement horizons. 
However, there is no clear indication that could postulate a link between age and 
aftermarket returns for IPO issued in cold markets. Here, the youngest firms 
underperform the market as well as old firms over three years.  
The results for the European IPO market suggest that riskier issues require higher 
initial returns and that age is a proxy for risk. This also suggests that the role of age 
differs for hot and cold markets and that age is a good proxy for investor sentiment, 
particularly for IPOs in hot markets. This is consistent with Helwege and Liang 
(2001) who find that  investors are much more (perhaps overly) optimistic in hot 
markets, as hot market firms may be able to go public at a more favourable price and 
certainly raise more money in their offering. 
 
C.3. Performance Categorized by Size 
 
In Table VI, firms are segmented by market capitalization (size) into three size 
categories. As shown in Table II, small offerings have slightly higher initial returns. 
Table VI discloses that smaller offering tend to have the best long-run performance. For 
example, the smallest IPOs with a market capitalization below 100 million at the first 
day of trading outperform the largest IPO firms by 57.86 percent over three years. This 
is similar for IPOs issued in hot and cold markets. As shown in Panels A, B, and C, 
the smallest IPOs outperform their larger peers for 27 of the 30 measurement horizons. 
Table VI also reveals a tendency for the smallest offerings in the immediate 
aftermarket to outperform the market and larger offerings. As seen earlier, our sample 
of small European IPOs is clustered in hot markets, indicated by the relatively small 
median size of companies going public (66.2 million).  Because small offerings 
typically have a small public float, they are particularly susceptible to institutional 
frictions prevailing in the immediate IPO aftermarket and to investor sentiment.  
Conversely, Ritter (1991) finds a tendency for smaller offerings, which also have the 
highest initial returns, to have the worst aftermarket performance. In his sample, all 
size-categories display poor long-run performance. Our results are consistent with our 
earlier observation that, in contrast to Brav and Gompers (1997), value-weighting does 
not change the results on aftermarket performance. Owing to their weak statistical 
power, however, results regarding the role of size in the European market need to be 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.4. Performance Categorized by Public Float 
 
Table VII segments the firms by the size of the public float. Here, we divide the 
sample into four groups. Based on the results from Table II, public float does not appear 
to be strongly related to the level of underpricing. 
 Three interpretations of Table VII are possible: First, there appears to be a linear 
relation between public float and market-adjusted aftermarket performance. These 
performance dynamics are pervasive. Companies issuing least, fare the best. Companies 
issuing most, fare the worst. For example, after three months of trading, the difference 
in the broad-market-adjusted return between companies with the smallest and the largest 
public float is 10.66 percent. This difference increases to 64.23 percent after three years 
in the aftermarket. The performance patterns are manifested particularly in firms that 
bring at least 50 percent of their company to the market. Second, the relation between 
public float and IPO return dynamics is relatively insensitive to the market condition at 
the IPO date. For instance, companies with the largest public float underperform 
companies with the lowest public float by 72.61 percent over three years when issued 
during hot markets, and by 54.86 percent during cold markets. Third, public float is 
significantly related to IPO performance in the immediate aftermarket. This effect 
appears to be stronger under hot markets than under cold markets. This is indicative 
of the strong influence of investor sentiment in driving a limited supply of shares, in a 
market characterized by institutional arrangements unrelated to fundamentals.   
The negative relation between public float and aftermarket performance for the 
European IPO market is consistent with several explanations in the literature. Primary 
among these are the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency hypothesis and the Leland and 
Pyle (1977) signaling hypothesis. In Jensen and Meckling (1976), a higher ownership 
retention rate, hence lower public float, reduces incentives to undertake non value 
maximizing projects. Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that, by retaining a significant 
stake in the firm, entrepreneurs can signal the quality of their firm since ramification 
can be costly. For US IPOs, Jain and Kini (1994) confirm the relatively superior post-
IPO operating performance where entrepreneurs retain a large stake in the firm.     
 
C.5. Performance Categorized by Sector 
 
The sample period has been characterized by an unprecedented change caused by 
the increasing role of information and communications technologies. In our final 
analysis of cross-sectional offerings characteristics, we study whether the aftermarket 
performance of European IPOs mirrors this change. 
For this purpose, we segment firms according to the attached Dow Jones STOXX 
global sector classification scheme. Initially, we categorize IPOs according to 18 market 
sectors. Then, we pool all companies in Sectors 5, 13, 16 and 17 into one group that 
represents the New Economy sectors (Technology, Media, Telecommunications and 
Healthcare). For our sample of 973 European IPOs, 270 accounted for New Economy 
IPOs (28 percent). All other IPOs are classified as Old Economy firms. The average 
New Economy firm is 16 years old and has a median size   of  51.7 million when going 
public. Conversely, we record an average age of 32 years and a median size of 84.9 
million for Old Economy firms. As seen in Table I, the sample composition of 
European IPOs has changed in favor of New Economy IPOs at the expense of Old 
Economy IPOs over time. The change in industry representation is indicative of the 




Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Sector       
Ri  = α + βDi  + εi 
The model is estimated for each of the return measurement horizons (1, 3, 12, 36 and 60 months) and for 
different market conditions (All Market Conditions, Hot Markets and Cold Markets). Ri is the broad-
market-adjusted return. Di is a (0,1) dummy variable taking the value of 0 if the firm belongs to a market 
sector defined as New Economy and 1 otherwise. New Economy firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 13, 16 
and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare, respectively. Old economy 
firms belong to all other sectors; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses.   
Panel A: Aftermarket Performance   Categorized by Market Sector: All Market Conditions 
  Number of Issues 
Aftermarket Ri  α S.E. β  S.E. Total D=0 D=1 
Month 1 0.0134b 0.0477a (0.0125) -0.0475a (0.0147) 973 270 703
Month 3 0.0315a 0.1160a (0.0196) -0.117a (0.0230) 972 270 702
Month 12 0.1229b 0.3685a (0.1087) -0.340a (0.1280) 970 270 700
Month 36 0.0845 1.3080a (0.3555) -1.593a (0.4056) 686 159 527
Month 60 -0.0205 0.7982a (0.2733) -1.010a (0.3034) 381 72 309
Panel B: Aftermarket Performance   Categorized by Market Sector: Hot Markets 
  Number of Issues 
Aftermarket Ri  α S.E. β  S.E. Total D=0 D=1 
Month 1 0.0210b 0.0566a (0.0160) -0.053a (0.0196) 657 217 440
Month 3 0.0458a 0.1315a (0.0253) -0.128a (0.0309) 656 217 439
Month 12 0.1614c 0.3749a (0.1451) -0.319c (0.1774) 655 217 438
Month 36 0.2448 1.8065a (0.5673) -2.147a (0.6651) 389 106 283
Month 60 0.1531 0.5148c (0.2663) -0.458 (0.2997) 119 25 94
Panel C: Aftermarket Performance Categorized by Market Sector: Cold Markets 
  Number of Issues 
Aftermarket Ri   α S.E. β  S.E. Total D=0 D=1 
Month 1 -0.0025 0.0114 (0.0166) -0.017 (0.0182) 316 53 263
Month 3 0.0020 0.0524b (0.0236) -0.061b (0.0259) 316 53 263
Month 12 0.0427 0.3420a (0.0792) -0.360a (0.0869) 315 53 262
Month 36 -0.1254c 0.3109c (0.1718) -0.531a (0.1895) 297 53 244
Month 60 -0.0994 0.9490b (0.3857) -1.278a (0.4257) 262 47 215
a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on a simple t-test.   
 
 Table II displays significant differences in terms of underpricing between New and 
Old Economy IPOs. The findings on aftermarket performance of New Economy versus 
Old Economy IPOs reported in Table VIII follow a similar, clearly distinctive 
performance pattern. New Economy stocks outperform the market as well as their peers 
during all measurement periods.  Figure 2 graphs the performance dynamics. The return 
differences are pervasive. For example, the spread in benchmark adjusted returns 
between New and Old Economy IPOs widened from 4.75 percent after the first month, 
to 34.0 percent over one year and to 159.30 percent after three years of aftermarket 
trading. Associated statistics underline the significance of the results that also prevail 
for IPOs issued in hot and cold markets. Within sectors, telecommu-          
nications, technology and healthcare had the best long-run performance, benefiting from 
deregulation, the global technology boom and the shift towards private medical care in 
Continental Europe. IPOs in sectors representing basic materials or industrial firms -
many  of which went public in the early 1990s during the boom in German construction 
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activity following the German Unification - fared the worst. All but 5 of the 18 industry 
groups recorded long-run underperformance. The magnitude of the performance 
differences in New versus Old Economy IPOs over such a long time period is puzzling. 
Generally, the findings are strongly supportive of Brav and Gompers (1997) conjecture 
that investors should not treat IPOs as a homogenous group and that subsample analysis 
can shed more light on the generality of the performance patterns.  For Old Economy 
IPOs, the findings can be interpreted as evidence that is consistent with the fact that 
firms take advantage of windows of opportunity in bringing their relatively old, 
mature companies with less growth and less earnings potential to the market. The 
evidence on New Economy IPOs, however, is not consistent with the predictions of 
either the windows of opportunity (Ritter (1991)) or fads (Shiller (1990)) 
hypothesis. It is also not consistent with theories that address the negative link between 
short- and long-run performance from an institutional perspective (Miller (1977)). The 
overperformance in New Economy stocks may stem from risk mismeasurement, 
investor sentiment or unexpected positive shocks, such as the sharp increase of the 
contribution of the New Economy to productivity growth during a period of 
unexpectedly prolonged economic growth during the 1990s (Gordon (2000)).28 
In Figure 3, we graph the difference in three-year performance of New Economy 
IPOs versus Old Economy IPOs for IPOs issued on a year-by-year basis. We also 
display the composition of the European IPO sample and extend the information to 
include  the  sample  composition  of  European IPOs during  1999 and 2000, the period  
                                                































Figure 2. Average market-adjusted aftermarket Performance Categorized by Sector. 
The initial sample is comprised of 703 Old Economy IPOs and 270 New Economy IPOs. New Economy
firms belong to Market Sectors 5, 13, 16 and 17, representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication
and Healthcare. Old Economy firms belong to all other economic sectors in the Dow Jones STOXX
global sector classification standard. Returns are measured as buy-and-hold returns from the close at the 
day of going public where one month is defined as consecutive 21-day-trading period using European 
trading days.  
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Figure 3. IPO Activity and Performance of New Economy IPOs. The initial sample of is 
comprised of 703 Old Economy and 270 New Economy IPOs offered between 1988-1998. During 1999 
and 2000, a total of 535 companies went public in the seven countries under study, 366 of those are 
classified as New Economy companies. New Economy IPOs belong to Market Sectors 5, 13, 16 and 17, 
representing Technology, Media, Telecommunication and Healthcare. Old Economy firms belong to all 
other economic sectors in the Dow Jones STOXX global industry classification scheme. Returns are 
measured as buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) from the close of the first day of trading to their three-year 
anniversary on the stock market whereas one month is defined as ac consecutive 21-day-trading period 
using European trading days.  
 
 
commonly referred to as Internet Bubble. Figure 3 underlines how New Economy 
IPOs issued between 1988 and 1998 outperformed their Old Economy peers 
consistently over a three-year horizon. The possible exceptions are Old Economy IPOs 
issued during 1992, which slightly overperformed over a three-year return window.29 
We also find a remarkable change in the sample composition during the Internet 
Bubble. This seems to be at least partly driven by the outperformance of previous 
years New Economy IPOs. 
 
 
D.  Regression Results 
  
The previous analysis shows that the cross-sectional patterns in European IPO 
performance are not mutually exclusive. For example, IPOs in New Economy sectors 
experienced the highest initial returns, tended to be the younger companies and also 
recorded higher returns across all measurement horizons compared their Old Economy 
peers. This observation holds for New Economy firms issued during hot and cold 
markets.  
To disentangle these observations, we perform univariate regression analysis using 
the raw return of the IPOs as the dependent variable similar to Ritter (1991). The 
explanatory variables are the unadjusted initial return, the logarithm of one plus age, the 
aftermarket return on the broad-market benchmark, the logarithm of one plus size, the 
public float and a (0,1) dummy variable representing New Economy firms. The results 
are displayed in Table IX. For the sample as a whole, the coefficient of determination is 
                                                
29 We also perform the analysis for the three individual hot and three cold markets defined in Table I 




















Difference between 3-year BHRs of New Economy IPOs vs. Old Economy IPOs (%)






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rather low across the measurement periods.30 It is markedly higher for IPOs issued in 
cold than in hot markets.  The parameter estimates support the conclusions that 
were obtained earlier.  The initial return category is correlated with the aftermarket 
performance of IPOs issued in cold markets, with four out of five measurement 
horizons being significantly positive. Age is correlated with immediate aftermarket 
returns for IPOs issued in hot markets, with all signs being negative across return 
windows. The coefficient on the market indicates that the beta for our sample of 
European IPOs is time-varying. Given the technology-led rise in share prices, 
particularly throughout the second half of the sample period, the coefficient on the 
market return of 1.28 over three years is in line with our expectation that IPOs are 
slightly riskier than the market. There is only weak evidence to support that size is 
correlated with returns, confirming our finding that value-weighting does not change 
our findings regarding aftermarket performance. Moreover, during 14 out of the 15 
return horizons studied, the coefficient on the public float is negative, supporting the 
signaling hypothesis. We also find a strong correlation between market sector and raw 
returns, underlining the substantial impact of the New Economy sectors on the results of 
overall aftermarket performance.  
 
 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The European IPO market has gone through a period of unprecedented change. New 
Economy sectors have gradually taken a bigger share of total IPO activity, indicating 
that money previously flowing into mature industries with lower growth prospects had 
started to flow into young, technology-oriented companies that focus on growth. This 
process was facilitated by rising stock markets, the initial success of privatizations 
fuelling a boom in European share ownership, and the creation of market segments 
dedictated to young, growth-oriented companies. However, it is unclear whether these 
developments represent either a structural shift or are just symptoms of a time-varying 
market condition.   
This study has focused on the return performance of a large sample of European 
IPOs during the period 1988-1998. The analysis has been pursued for the sample as a 
whole and also under two alternative market conditions: for IPOs issued in hot 
markets, when initial returns are high and the general level of the stock market is 
increasing; and for IPOs issued in cold markets, when initial returns are low and the 
general stock market level is stable or declining. We have split the research agenda into 
two units: the examination of initial returns and the examination of aftermarket 
performance. We find significant autocorrelation, which is higher for the number of 
offerings than for the initial returns. Not surprisingly, we also find significant 
underpricing, which is related to ex-ante characteristics of uncertainty. We attribute the 
large amounts of money left on the table during our sample period to some large 
privatizations.   
While we present evidence of short-term overperformance, the results do not 
indicate that IPOs offered underperform in the long-run. This result appears to be robust 
across time periods underlining the most recent literature arguing that the long-run 
underperformance of IPOs is a time-varying phenomenon. Our results are also sensitive 
to the benchmark employed and return methodology with IPO outperformance being 
most magnified when compared against small- and medium- sized company 
                                                
30 We have also experimented with adjusted R2 s, and do not find qualitatively different results.  
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benchmarks. The long-run positive aftermarket performance, however, is limited to 
IPOs issued in hot markets.  In cold markets, the broad-market-adjusted equally-
weighted performance is strongly negative. Moreover, the results on aftermarket 
performance worsen substantially when looking at the median picture, with some 
extreme returns driving the performance.   
In order to shed some light on the underlying dynamics of aftermarket performance, 
we categorize returns according to a set of issuing characteristics. We find a strong 
impact of the initial return category. Here, companies with higher initial returns fare 
best, underlining the role of underpricing as a signal of firm quality. The quality of the 
underpricing signal is best in cold markets which are characterised by less noise. 
The evidence also points to a strong signaling role of the size of the public float, in the 
sense that it is positively related to aftermarket performance across measurement 
horizons. This is true for IPOs issued in both hot and cold markets.  Moreover, the 
cross-sectional findings in this study provide definitive testimony of the overriding 
influence of the New Economy during the 1990s, which had a dramatic impact on the 
investment world in general and the European IPO market in particular. We show that 
the relatively good average performance of European IPOs issued between 1988 and 
1998 is due to offerings in the New Economy that account for just 28 percent of the 
sample.  While we do not adjust for risk, it is unlikely that beta alone can account for 
the performance differences. These results extend across all measurement horizons. 
Through the outburst of IPO activity in the New Economy sectors relative to the Old 
Economy on the New Market segments during the height of the Internet Bubble in 
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Table AI  
Global Sector Classification Standard31 
The Dow Jones STOXX global sector classification standard groups companies that have similar primary 
revenue sources. There are 10 economic sectors and derived from these  in increasingly finer 
classifications  are 18 market sectors (used for this study), 51 industry groups and 89 sub-groups.  New 
Economy firms (270) belong to Market Sectors 5, 13, 16 and 17, representing Media [MDI], Healthcare 
[HCR], Technology [TEC] and Telecommunications [TLS], respectively. For the purpose of this study, 
all other Market Sectors are defined as belonging to the Old Economy. Europe (EU) = Total Number of 
IPOs issued between 1988 and 1998 in Germany (BD), France (FR), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), 
Spain (SP), Sweden (SD) and Switzerland (SW).  
 Market Sectors Country and Number of IPOs 
  EU BD FR IT NL SP SD SW 
1 Basic Resources [BAS] 46 5 13 3 3 9 11 2 
2 Chemicals [CHM] 27 4 10 4 5 1 0 3 
3 Automobiles [ATO] 36 10 11 4 4 1 6 0 
4 Cyclical Goods and Services [CGS] 124 33 39 21 6 9 10 6 
5 Media [MDI] 32 3 18 3 1 2 5 0 
6 Retail [RTS] 44 16 19 1 3 1 4 0 
7 Food & Beverage [FOB] 51 7 24 2 1 12 3 2 
8 Non-Cyclical Goods & Services [NCG] 63 13 26 1 8 9 5 1 
9 Energy [ENE] 11 0 4 2 1 2 2 0 
10 Banks [BNK] 20 3 2 6 0 6 2 1 
11 Financial Services [FSV] 58 12 13 6 4 9 13 1 
12 Insurance [INS] 17 4 5 5 0 2 0 1 
13 Healthcare [HCR] 54 7 22 1 4 0 14 6 
14 Construction [CNS] 47 18 8 2 3 13 3 0 
15 Industrial Goods & Services [IGS] 147 32 45 12 7 9 34 8 
16 Technology [TEC] 170 43 56 1 24 1 34 11 
17 Telecommunications [TLS] 14 4 6 0 1 0 2 1 
18 Utilities [UTI] 12 5 2 3 0 2 0 0 
          
















                                                
31 For the complete classification standard see: http://www.stoxx.com/indexes/guide/index_guide.pdf 
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Table AII   
  Aftermarket Performance (Value-Weighted)        
The initial sample contains 973 European Initial Public Offerings between 1988 and 1998. Aftermarket 
returns are measured as value-weighted buy-and-hold returns whereas one month is defined as 
consecutive 21-day trading interval from the close of the first day of trading using European trading days, 
assuming a declining sample size.  If the IPO is delisted before the end of the measurement period, we 
calculate the return until the delisting date. Aftermarket returns are compared with alternative 
benchmarks. The Dow Jones STOXX, size-based benchmarks, ex. UK, were used as a proxy for the 
European market. The wealth relative (WR) is the ratio on one plus the average aftermarket period buy-
and-hold IPO return divided by one plus the average aftermarket benchmark buy-and-hold return. For 
example, for the month 36 adjustment of IPO returns for the movement in the broad market, 
(1+0.7414)/(1+0.6495) = 1.06; Standard Errors (S.E.) in parentheses. 
Aftermarket Performance of IPOs: All Market Conditions 
  IPO and Benchmark Returns 
 Raw Broad- Wealth Large- Wealth Mid- Wealth Small- Wealth 
Aftermarket Return Market Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative Caps Relative
Month 1 0.0059 0.0116 0.99 0.0147 0.99 0.0057 1.00 -0.0049 1.01
(N=973) (0.0068) (0.0117) (0.0067) (0.0148) (0.0067) (0.0057) (0.0053) (-0.0048) (0.0066)
Month 3 0.0374a 0.0463 0.99 0.0526 0.99 0.0321 1.01 0.0096 1.03a
(N=972) (0.0111) (0.0467) (0.0104) (0.0534) (0.0104) (0.0319) (0.0105) (0.0093) (0.0105)
Month 12 0.2422a 0.1513 1.08 0.1766 1.06 0.0882 1.14a 0.0147 1.22a
(N=970) (0.0582) (0.1402) (0.0575) (0.1673) (0.0576) (0.0773) (0.0576) (0.0120) (0.0578)
Month 36 0.7412a 0.6495 1.06 0.7625 0.99 0.3784 1.26b 0.1128 1.56a
(N=686) (0.1746) (0.6153) (0.1729) (0.7718) (0.1733) (0.2996) (0.1733) (0.0721) (0.1735)
Month 60 0.7763a 1.1732 0.82a 1.4143 0.74a 0.6698 1.06 0.2003 1.48a
(N=381) (0.1245) (1.4353) (0.1178) (1.9223) (0.1177) (0.6296) (0.1193) (0.1353) (0.1210)




























Table AIII  
Cumulative Average IPO Returns (CARs) for  
Alternative Benchmarks  
Aftermarket Returns are measured as Cumulative Average Returns (CARs) (not in percent), with 
associated Standard Errors (S.E.) (in parentheses) for 60 months after going public, excluding the initial 
returns. One month is defined as a consecutive 21-day trading interval using European trading days. The 
value-weighted Dow Jones STOXX size indices (Broad-Market, Large-Caps, Mid-Caps and Small Caps), 
excluding UK, were used as a proxy for the market benchmark respectively.     
Month IPO Return Broad Market adjusted 
Large-Cap 
adjusted Mid-Cap adjusted 
Small-Cap 
adjusted 
 CAR S.E. CAR S.E. CAR S.E. CAR S.E. CAR S.E. 
1 0.0312a (0.0068) 0.0134b (0.0066) 0.0106 (0.0067) 0.0208a (0.0066) 0.0296a (0.0066)
2 0.0461a (0.0087) 0.0215b (0.0084) 0.0166b (0.0084) 0.0347a (0.0084) 0.0500a (0.0085)
3 0.0512a (0.0105) 0.0252a (0.0098) 0.0187c (0.0098) 0.0431a (0.0098) 0.0646a (0.0098)
4 0.0678a (0.0122) 0.0346a (0.0112) 0.0263b (0.0112) 0.0569a (0.0113) 0.0857a (0.0114)
5 0.0862a (0.0141) 0.0432a (0.0131) 0.0332b (0.0131) 0.0685a (0.0131) 0.1054a (0.0133)
6 0.0933a (0.0151) 0.0327b (0.0141) 0.0203 (0.0142) 0.0636a (0.0142) 0.1083a (0.0143)
7 0.1036a (0.0158) 0.0205 (0.0149) 0.0060 (0.0150) 0.0582a (0.0149) 0.1091a (0.0151)
8 0.1097a (0.0165) 0.0115 (0.0156) -0.0045 (0.0159) 0.0540a (0.0156) 0.1094a (0.0158)
9 0.1247a (0.0173) 0.0093 (0.0162) -0.0085 (0.0162) 0.0577a (0.0162) 0.1176a (0.0164)
10 0.1339a (0.0179) 0.0097 (0.0171) -0.0091 (0.0171) 0.0605a (0.0170) 0.1227a (0.0172)
11 0.1391a (0.0183) 0.0069 (0.0176) -0.0127 (0.0175) 0.0593a (0.0174) 0.1246a (0.0176)
12 0.1499a (0.0197) -0.0005 (0.0204) -0.0226 (0.0188) 0.0588a (0.0188) 0.1322a (0.0190)
13 0.1588a (0.0210) -0.0081 (0.0201) -0.0323 (0.0201) 0.0564a (0.0200) 0.1374a (0.0202)
14 0.1651a (0.0226) -0.0110 (0.0215) -0.0370c (0.0215) 0.0590a (0.0214) 0.1440a (0.0216)
15 0.1800a (0.0240) -0.0089 (0.0227) -0.0368 (0.0228) 0.0673a (0.0228) 0.1550a (0.0228)
16 0.1917a (0.0257) -0.0065 (0.0242) -0.0361 (0.0242) 0.0738a (0.0242) 0.1662a (0.0243)
17 0.1977a (0.0264) -0.0188 (0.0250) -0.0512b (0.0250) 0.0688a (0.0251) 0.1673a (0.0251)
18 0.2028a (0.0272) -0.0346 (0.0257) -0.0694a (0.0258) 0.0579b (0.0258) 0.1662a (0.0258)
19 0.2170a (0.0275) -0.0424 (0.0261) -0.0794a (0.0262) 0.0560b (0.0262) 0.1697a (0.0262)
20 0.2413a (0.0282) -0.0408 (0.0268) -0.0795a (0.0269) 0.0636b (0.0270) 0.1793a (0.0269)
21 0.2688a (0.0292) -0.0342 (0.0279) -0.0743a (0.0280) 0.0758a (0.0281) 0.1930a (0.0280)
22 0.2762a (0.0290) -0.0349 (0.0281) -0.0758a (0.0281) 0.0772a (0.0282) 0.1959a (0.0280)
23 0.2902a (0.0295) -0.0294 (0.0285) -0.0717 b (0.0286) 0.0856a (0.0286) 0.206a (0.0285)
24 0.2893a (0.0301) -0.0388 (0.0291) -0.0833a (0.0292) 0.0817a (0.0292) 0.2066a (0.0291)
25 0.2733a (0.0302) -0.0621b (0.0291) -0.1088a (0.0292) 0.0628b (0.0293) 0.1945a (0.0291)
26 0.2748a (0.0305) -0.0703b (0.0294) -0.1181a (0.0295) 0.0572c (0.0295) 0.1928a (0.0294)
27 0.2661a (0.0307) -0.0860a (0.0295) -0.1351a (0.0296) 0.0438 (0.0296) 0.1832a (0.0295)
28 0.2548a (0.0311) -0.1022a (0.0297) -0.1538a (0.0298) 0.0321 (0.0299) 0.1794a (0.0299)
29 0.2574a (0.0313) -0.1109a (0.0298) -0.1645a (0.0298) 0.0269 (0.0300) 0.1812a (0.0299)
30 0.2250a (0.0316) -0.1482a (0.0302) -0.2043a (0.0302) -0.0060 (0.0302) 0.1567a (0.0303)
31 0.2258a (0.0319) -0.1599a (0.0303) -0.2179a (0.0304) -0.0134 (0.0306) 0.1551a (0.0305)
32 0.2315a (0.0327) -0.1718a (0.0312) -0.2315a (0.0312) -0.0223 (0.0313) 0.1505a (0.0313)
33 0.2325a (0.0342) -0.1951a (0.0323) -0.2575a (0.0324) -0.0434 (0.0324) 0.1397a (0.0325)
34 0.2569a (0.0353) -0.1850a (0.0332) -0.2495a (0.0333) -0.0317 (0.0333) 0.1579a (0.0335)
35 0.2595a (0.0365) -0.1929a (0.0342) -0.2591a (0.0343) -0.0381 (0.0343) 0.1550a (0.0344)
36 0.2658a (0.0376) -0.2052a (0.0350) -0.2742a (0.0350) -0.0467 (0.0351) 0.1552a (0.0353)
37 0.2854a (0.0383) -0.2082a (0.0356) -0.2808a (0.0357) -0.0407 (0.0357) 0.1730a (0.0359)
38 0.2938a (0.0388) -0.2199a (0.0362) -0.2947a (0.0362) -0.0451 (0.0363) 0.1742a (0.0364)
39 0.2952a (0.0391) -0.2293a (0.0365) -0.3053a (0.0365) -0.0519 (0.0366) 0.1708a (0.0368)
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Appendix C continued: 
40 0.2898a (0.0403) -0.2399a (0.0378) -0.3175a (0.0378) -0.0607 (0.0379) 0.1658a (0.0381)
41 0.2651a (0.0389) -0.2748a (0.0362) -0.3548a (0.0362) -0.0923b (0.0363) 0.1396a (0.0367)
42 0.2736a (0.0394) -0.2732a (0.0368) -0.3551a (0.0368) -0.0874b (0.0370) 0.1511a (0.0373)
43 0.2652a (0.0400) -0.2926a (0.0375) -0.3767a (0.0375) -0.1024a (0.0376) 0.1433a (0.0379)
44 0.2752a (0.0403) -0.2986a (0.0376) -0.3838a (0.0376) -0.1065a (0.0377) 0.1436a (0.0381)
45 0.2968a (0.0413) -0.2951a (0.0384) -0.3826a (0.0385) -0.1012a (0.0386) 0.1552a (0.0389)
46 0.2930a (0.0416) -0.3097a (0.0386) -0.3995a (0.0386) -0.1133a (0.0388) 0.1490a (0.0392)
47 0.3083a (0.0440) -0.2975a (0.0411) -0.3882a (0.0411) -0.1012b (0.0412) 0.1634a (0.0416)
48 0.3210 a (0.0452) -0.2934a (0.0423) -0.3855a (0.0423) -0.0946b (0.0425) 0.1742a (0.0429)
49 0.2990a (0.0450) -0.3239a (0.0419) -0.4188a (0.0419) -0.1194a (0.0421) 0.1565a (0.0427)
50 0.3113a (0.0448) -0.3212a (0.0420) -0.4174a (0.0420) -0.1141a (0.0422) 0.1696a (0.0427)
51 0.3181a (0.0455) -0.3232a (0.0430) -0.4205a (0.0430) -0.1136a (0.0431) 0.1735a (0.0435)
52 0.3000 a (0.0465) -0.3296a (0.0444) -0.4289a (0.0444) -0.1200a (0.0445) 0.1733a (0.0449)
53 0.3011a (0.0464) -0.3295a (0.0444) -0.4305a (0.0443) -0.1181a (0.0443) 0.1814a (0.0446)
54 0.2895a (0.0474) -0.3448a (0.0451) -0.4480a (0.0451) -0.1310a (0.0450) 0.1756a (0.0454)
55 0.3057a (0.0481) -0.3432a (0.0459) -0.4483a (0.0459) -0.1251a (0.0459) 0.1876a (0.0462)
56 0.3281a (0.0480) -0.3394a (0.0459) -0.4456a (0.0459) -0.1167b (0.0459) 0.1991a (0.0462)
57 0.3385a (0.0493) -0.3339a (0.0474) -0.4413a (0.0474) -0.1114b (0.0473) 0.2075a (0.0474)
58 0.3388a (0.0501) -0.3322a (0.0482) -0.4412a (0.0483) -0.1094b (0.0480) 0.2127a (0.0482)
59 0.3347a (0.0505) -0.3404a (0.0487) -0.4501a (0.0487) -0.1157b (0.0485) 0.2061a (0.0485)
60 0.3525a (0.0532) -0.3220a (0.0506) -0.4328a (0.0506) -0.0964c (0.0505) 0.2263a (0.0506)
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Figure A1. The Long-Run Performance of IPOs in Europe. Cumulative average returns 
(CARs) for an equally-weighted portfolio of European Initial Public Offerings, with monthly rebalancing, 
month 1 to 60. One month is defined as a consecutive 21-day trading interval using European trading 
days. Five CAR series are plotted for the first 60 months after the IPO date: 1) Raw returns (no 
adjustment), 2) broad-market adjustment using the STOXX broad-market index (value-weighted), 
excluding UK, 3) large-cap adjustment using the STOXX large-cap index (value-weighted), excluding 
UK, 4) mid-cap adjustment using the STOXX mid-cap index (value-weighted), excluding UK and 5) 
small-cap adjustment using the STOXX small-cap index (value-weighted), excluding UK.  Month 0 is the 
initial return interval. Returns were calculated on the basis of final closing prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
